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Note
PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER TITLE VII:
PROTECTION FOR BOTH PARTIES?
The procedural structure of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was
designed to safeguard the rights of both plaintiffs and defendants in
employment discrimination suits. Frequently ignoring the plain lan-
guage of the Act, the courts and the EEOC have interpreted the
remedial nature of the statute to create a bias in favor of the Title VII
plaintiff. Through an examination of judicial interpretation of Title
VII procedures in private and EEOC suits, the author concludes that
the confusion created by such inaccurate interpretation is detrimental
to the rights of both parties and fails to implement the policies of the
Civil Rights Act.
I. INTRODUMTON
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' as amended in 1972,2
leaves "much to be desired in clarity and-precision," 3 particularly
in portions of the Act that deal with procedure. The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission is the agency charged with in-
terpretation of the Act, but its regulations are not always consistent
with the statutory language, and the Commission has been known
to ignore its rules when expediency so requires. The resulting con-
fusion has worked to the detriment of both plaintiffs and defen-
dants in Title VII suits.
The typical Title VII plaintiff files a claim with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission expecting a speedy and fair
resolution of his problem. Although the Commission and the courts
purport to be on the side of the layman/plaintiff, he may find him-
self waiting months or even years for his case to be resolved. And
if he finally does fie suit, his case may be dismissed for lack of
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Act].
2. The Act was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e,
2000e-1, -2(a)(2), (c)(2), -3, -4(a)-(g), -5(a)-(g), (i)-(j), -6(c)-(e),
-8(b)-(d), -9, -13, -14, -16 (Supp. IV, 1974)). The remainder of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act can be found codified in scattered sections of
5 U.S.C.
3. Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1969).
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jurisdiction, even if he follows the procedural directions provided
him by the EEOC.
A similar dilemma may await the defendant in a Title VII ac-
tion. The defendant, typically a company or union, can be subject
to virtually unlimited investigation by the Commission on the basis
of one charge. If a judicial complaint is filed, it may contain al-
legations of which the defendant was previously unaware. And,
if the Commission is not prompt in its decision to file suit, the de-
fendant may be subject to back-pay liability for a period far in
excess of the two years provided in the Act. The result is that the
courts find themselves burdened with stale claims and endless pro-
cedural litigation.
It is the thesis of this Note that the procedures provided in the
Act were formulated to protect both parties and that any interpreta-
tion which ignores or circumvents the plain language of the Act
must be rejected. In the words of Senator Brock:
The public is entitled to have its business handled by the
Government in an efficient manner....
[But equally] important is that the procedures be equit-
able. Fundamental to our system of justice is fairness. In
our desire to achieve equal employment opportunity we
must be fair to both the respondent and the complainant.
We cannot forsake the principle that anyone charged with
violating the law is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
He is entitled to be tried by an impartial tribunal.4
Contrasted to this is the present judicial attitude, reflected in the
words of an Alabama district court: "Our polestar in this analysis
should be the fundamental principle of Title VII that procedural
niceties should not be used to impede a claimant in his quest for
a hearing on the merits of his case." 5
The procedural bias in favor of Title VII plaintiffs which has
developed in the courts is a result of interpreting the Act as a
"remedial" statute.6 This classification implies that legislation is
to be read broadly to supply or restore rights to a class of persons
4. 118 CONG. REC. 732 (remarks of Senator Brock) (1972).
5. Shafield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp.
937, 940 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
6. See Antonopulos v. Aerojet-General Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1390 (E.D.
Cal. 1968). "We are not dealing with businessmen-plaintiffs or plaintiffs
accustomed to consulting lawyers about their rights. This law is a remedial
one .... Id. at 1395.
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who were formerly denied those rights. A similar bias is evident
in the Commission's efforts to bypass its own regulations when they
tend to hinder enforcement. The problem with this approach is
that it has tended to deemphasize procedural rights granted to both
parties by distorting the statutory time scheme. One might question
why, after the major revision of the statute in 1972, a detailed pro-
cedural format was preserved. Presumably the system was meant
to even-handedly preserve the rights of both parties. However,
much of its symmetry has been destroyed through piecemeal judicial
interpretation.
But the EEOC regulations and the judicial gloss liberalizing the
statute cannot be ignored. Parties, lay and lawyer alike, are forced
to deal with them in every Title VII action. Only by recognizing
the inconsistencies and dealing with them can the difficulties be
resolved. This Note will highlight some of the procedural problems
as they affect the private suit and the EEOC suit
II. THE Stucrurtu oF TH= Acr
In the original Civil Rights Act of 1964, a right of action was
created in an individual who was being discriminated against be-
cause of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.7 Under the
statutory scheme the individual was given the dual role of private
litigant and public attorney general charged with the primary duty
of enforcing a congressional act" The EEOC was only empowered
to investigate charges and attempt conciliation between the parties;9
except for certain exceptional situations, it could not bring an action
for court enforcement or injunction. 10
The 1972 amendments gave the Commission a more prominent
role in policing employment practices. The originally proposed
amendments would have granted the Commission cease and desist
powers similar to those of the National Labor Relations Board.
However, a last minute legislative compromise resulted in the
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
8. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
9. Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301, 1305 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 782 (1976).
10. For a more thorough discussion, see Berg, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 62 (1964);
Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 40 GEO. Ws. L. lEv. 824 (1972); Developments in the Law:
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84
HAv. L. REv. 1109 (1971).
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limited enforcement power to initiate an action in federal court
against the offending party. As a result of this measure, much of
the floor debate on the bill is useless as legislative history, and
many internal ambiguities were created in the Act itself.
The original version of the Act set up a compact and carefully
timed system for filing and processing a charge. The complainant
was given 90 days from the time of the allegedly unlawful employ-
ment practice to file a charge with the EEOC.11 If the state had
a fair employment practices commission, the charge was first to
be filed locally and the complainant then had 210 days from the
date of the allegedly illegal practice to fie with the EEOC.12 The
EEOC was given 30 days (usually expanded to 60) from the date
of the allegedly illegal practice to investigate the charge and to
attempt a conciliation. Upon the expiration of the 30 (or 60) day
period, the Commission was to notify the complainant of his right
to file suit if conciliation efforts had failed. The individual was
then allowed to bring a private suit within 30 days of receipt of
this notice.13
Unfortunately, this timetable proved too restrictive for the Com-
mission. Certain changes were made under the 1972 amendments
to help ease its burden. The time for filing a charge with the
Commission has been expanded from 90 to 180 days, or from 210
to 300 days if the state has a fair employment practices commis-
sion.14 The EEOC must now serve notice on the charged party
within 10 days of the filing of the complaint.15 The Commission
has also been empowered to bring an action after a 30-day recon-
ciliation period has passed,' 6 but if it has not instituted suit or
achieved a conciliation 180 days. after a charge was ified, it must
notify the complainant, who then has an additional 90 days during
which he may bring his own suit.' 7 As a further exhortation to
speed, the district court is admonished to "cause the case to be
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
(Supp. IV, 1974).
12. Id. §§ 2000e-5(b), (c), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (d)
(Supp. IV, 1974). If the complaint had initially been filed with the state
agency, the time for filing with the EEOC would have been increased to
210 days.
13. Id. § 2 0 00e-5(e), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV,
1974).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. IV, 1974).
15. Id. § 2000e-5(b).




in every way expedited." If a trial has not been scheduled within
120 days of the time when the issue is joined, the assigned judge
may appoint a master to assist him.18
Although on its face the statutory scheme appears to establish
a detailed and specific procedural timetable, certain glaring omis-
sions remain. There is no outside time limit on the state agency
that elects to keep a case longer than 60 days,19 nor is there a time
limit during which the EEOC must bring suit.20 And, there is still
no limit to the time a case can drag on once it reaches the district
court.
These technical requirements have provided a fertile ground for
recent litigation. However, the resolutions reached by the courts
are in some instances far removed from the literal statutory re-
quirements. Much of the morass surrounding Title VII litigation is
a result of a lack of judicial uniformity in approaching the statute-
a confusion between jurisdiction and procedure.
III. Tim PRATE Surr
A. Jurisdktional Requirements
As the previous discussion illustrates, the Act describes a de-
tailed procedure which must be followed in filing a Title VII
charge. However, the federal courts have isolated two procedural
steps2' as "jurisdictional" prerequisites to the private suit. The
individual complainant must (1) fie a timely charge of employ-
ment discrimination with the EEOC, and (2) receive and act upon
the Commission's statutory notice of the right to sue.22
18. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(5). See also Harris v. Sherwood Medical Indus.,
Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 1974). Although this provision is reflec-
tive of a general legislative intent to speed up the process, it is otherwise
useless. Presumably under the Federal Rules a federal judge can appoint a
master at any time, FED. B. Civ. P. 53, and the Act fails to give any outside
time limit on how long a case may actually take in the district court.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (Supp. IV, 1974).
20. See id. Some courts have read in a limit of 180 days. See notes
128-33 infra and accompanying text.
21. These requirements were first set forth in Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968) without explanation or case support.
22. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974); McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); Beverly v. Lone
Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971); Cox v. United
States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ind. 1968), affd, 409 F.2d 289
(7th Cir. 1969).
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In this context, "jurisdictional" presumably refers to subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. Although the courts and the commentators have
spoken as if that were the case,23 their approach raises some dis-
turbing questions. For example, of all the procedural require-
ments listed in the Act; why did the courts choose these two as
delimiting the complainant's right of action? Traditionally, sub-
ject matter jurisdiction has referred to the power of the federal
courts to entertain an action.2 If this is so, can liberal statutory
interpretation that expands or contracts the federal courts' "power"
to hear cases be constitutionally justified? Do the actions of the
parties and the "equities" of the situation enable a court to hear
cases over which it otherwise would have no subject matter juris-
diction? Or, has the term "jurisdictional" been used inaccurately
and inarticulately to describe a waivable restriction which is really
only procedural?
Constitutionally, the lower federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction; their existence and their power depend upon specific
acts of Congress.25
[J]urisdiction over the subject matter exists when the con-
stitution or the legislature or the unwritten law has told
this court to do something about this kind of dispute.
Once the defendant and the dispute are thus properly
in this court, then, . . . [w]hat the court does about the
dispute merely involves the exercise of its power to adjudi-
cate it somehow.2
Title VII gives the federal courts power--"jurisdiction"-to hear
employment discrimination disputes. However, when the courts
refer to procedural rules as "jurisdictional prerequisites," they are
merely confusing discretion, whether they ought to hear a case,
with jurisdiction, their power to hear the case. "When the word
[jurisdiction] is employed in this unfortunate and confusing sense,
it is wholly disconnected with the existence of power."27 Further-
23. See, e.g., Comment, A Primer to Procedure and Remedy Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act-of 1964, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 407, 409 (1970).
24. Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 205 F. 857, 859-60 (2d
Cir. 1913); Morse, Judicial Self Denial and judicial Activism-the Personality
of the Original Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts, 3 CLEv.-MA x. L.
REV. 101, 107 (1954).
25. Morse, supra note 24, at 113-14.
26. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurrY 306 (1950) (emphasis orig-
inal).
27. Id. at 303.
[Vol. 27:371
TITLE VII PROCEDURES
more, the courts have not generally distinguished true jurisdictional
questions from what Professor Chafee terms "principles of right
decision." 28 Such a distinction would help clarify otherwise puz-
zling dispositions of so-called jurisdictional questions in plaintiffs'
Title VII suits.
The problem of defining the nature of the two prerequisites is
most evident when the courts try to apply "equitable" considera-
tions to solve Title VII "jurisdictional" questions. Much confusion
could be avoided by replacing "jurisdictionar with a less -restric-
tive term such as "procedural." This distinction is sigificant,
there is a vast difference between treatment accorded jurisdictional
prerequisites and that accorded such procedural requirements
as statutes of limitations. Failure of a condition that is jurisdic-
tional extinguishes the right of action and the liability; it is not
merely a bar to the remedy.29 On the other hand, a procedural
condition, such as a statute of limitations, may bar a remedy, but
it does not extinguish the right of action or the liability. Tradi-
tional equitable doctrines such as waiver, tolling, and estoppel can
revive the claim or extend the limitation. 0
With these distinctions in mind, treatment afforded the two
"jurisdictional prerequisites" by the courts will be examined.
1. Filing the Charge
Filing a "timely charge" is the first requirement of a private
Title VII suit. According to -the Act, a charge is timely if it is
filed no more than 180 days after the allegedly unlawful employ-
ment practi-e.3a The charge must be filed by or on behalf of.the
individual claimant, or by the Commission.3 2 The Act also requires
that the charge be "in writing under oath." 3 3 The requirement of
a "writing under oath" is treated as procedural; the original "com-
plaint" is often simply an unswom letter setting out the complain-
ants grievance, but the EEOC regulations allow any defect in the
28. Id. at 314.
29. See cases discussed in Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 525 F.2d 124,
127-28 (6th Cir. 1975).
30. Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 927 (5th
Cir. 1975).
31. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. IV, 1974).
33. Id. § 2000e-5(a).
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charge to be remedied by amendment relating back to the date
of the original charge.34
The courts have generally followed the Commission in this
interpretation. The general .riile was expressed in Choate v. Cater-
pillar Tractor Co.: 5 the requirement that the complaint be ified
under oath should be interpreted as "directory and technical rather
than mandatory and substantive." 36 The plaintiff can verify or add
to his statements at a -later time and preserve the filing date of his
original charge.
Other courts have gone further in liberalizing the writing re-
quirement and have not required that the sworn charge refer speci-
fically to the earlier unsworn statement. So long as the same events
were mentioned in both and the charge could be reasonably inter-
preted as relating to the earlier complaint, the requirement of a
writing under oath has been held satsified.3 7 The facts in Pittman v.
Anaconda Wire & Cable Co.,3 8 are representative of this class of
cases.
In Pittman, the plaintiff sent an unsworn letter of complaint to
the EEOC on the date his employment was terminated for allegedly
discriminatory motives by the defendant company. Four hundred
fifty days later, the plaintiff filed a written, sworn, formal charge
with the Commission. The defendant company moved to dismiss
for lack of subject ffiatter jurisdiction claiming that the plaintiff
had failed to file a "timely charge." The court refused to grant
the dismissal, holding that, since the defects in the first informal
complaint were cured by the second formal one, the complaint
was timely since the effective date of filing was that of the first"a
The court'i explanation that "these jurisdictional requirements must
not be technically construed to defeat the purpose of the Act" 40
is an example of the confusion brought about by using the "juris-
dictional" label. Certainly if the requirement is really a restric-
tion on subject matter jurisdiction, the court must interpret it "tech-
nically." For example, no federal court has suggested that the
34. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11 (1975). See also Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 402 F.2d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 1968).
35. 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
36. Id. at 359.
37. Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 293 F. Supp. 574 (W.D.N.C.
1968).
38. 11 BNA FAro EmPL. PRAcr. CAs. 9 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
39. Id. at 12-13.
40. Id. at 11.
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jurisdictional requirement of case or controversy be interpreted
other than technically. If, on the other hand, the court meant
that the purpose of the Act was to afford private, untutored com-
plainants a right of action in the federal courts by giving the courts
subject matter jurisdiction, then it might well have argued that
less than strict compliance with procedural rules should not defeat
the plaintiff's right of action.
The time period for filing, like the requirement of a writing
under oath, has been liberally interpreted by many courts to give
the complainant every available chance to bring his suit. For
instance, in Davis v. Valley Distributing Co.41 the plaintiff filed
his first complaint with the Arizona Civil Bights Commission 114
days after an allegedly discriminatory discharge. Since this was
long past the 60 day state statute of limitations, the Arizona Com-
mission dismissed the complaint The plaintiff then filed with the
EEOC 135 days after the discriminatory act. The EEOC referred
the complaint to the Arizona commission, but the state commis-
sion returned it to the EEOC. One hundred fifty-two days after
the allegedly discriminatory act the EEOC assumed jurisdiction. At
this time the period for filing a Title VII action with the EEOC
was 90 days, or 210 days if the complaint were first filed with a
state FEP Commission. 4
After the plaintiff fied with the EEOC, but before that Com-
mission assumed jurisdiction, the 1972 amendments became effec-
tive. These amendments lengthened the time period for filing
with the EEOC from 90 to 180 days, or from 210 to 300 days in
a state like Arizona that had an FEP Commission.43 Section 14 of
the 1972 amendments provided that the new time framework
would apply to 11] charges "pending with the Commission on
the date of enactment . . . and [2] all charges filed .thereafter" 44
The court found that the charge filed by the plaintiff with the
EEOC was timely. If the charge were considered filed when the
EEOC received it 135 days after the plaintiff's discharge, then it
41. 522 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975).
42. Id. at 829, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. IV, 1974).
44. Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 14, 86 Stat. 103 (the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act is codified in scattered sections of 5, 42
U.S.C.). "The amendments made by this Act to section 706 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 shall be applicable with respect to charges pending with
the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act and all charges filed
thereafter." Id.
1976]
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was "pending" when the amendments took effect. If it were con-
sidered filed when the EEOC assumed jurisdiction 152 days after
the discharge, then it was a charge filed "thereafter." The court
applied the 180-day limitation of the amended Act,45 although
the events occurred while the shorter 90-day limitation of the
original Act was effective.
If this court had treated a "timely filing" as a jurisdictional
requirement, presumably it would not have been empowered to
hear the merits of the case, because under that interpretation the
plaintiff's right of action would have ceased to exist at the end
of 90 days. Instead, the court treated the time period as a statute
of limitations. Since "statutes of limitations go to matters of rem-
edy, not to destruction of fundamental rights," 46 the court had
the power to hear the dispute, and the defendant's liability was
not extinguished when the plaintiff failed to file within 90 days.
The effect of the new statute of limitations was to restore the plain-
tiff's right to a remedy by removing a bar to the defendant's sub-
stantive liability. The subject matter jurisdiction of the court was
not affected.
Upon a similar set of facts, however, an Indiana district court
reached the opposite result. In Bottoms v. St. Vincent's Hospital,47
the plaintiff first filed her charge with the EEOC 122 days after
the alleged act of discrimination. At that time both the EEOC
and the state commission had a 90-day limitation period for filing
complaints. The EEOC referred the charge to the state FEP
commission, which returned it to the EEOC without taking any
action. The plaintiff argued that the longer 210-day limitation
period should apply for filing with the EEOC because the charge
had been referred to a state agency, although she had not filed
with either the state agency or the EEOC within their time limits.48
This argument might be plausible if the 90-day limit were treated
as a statute of limitations, since the right of action would not
have been extinguished by the plaintiff's failure to meet the 90-
day limit in either forum. However, the court treated the 90-day
limit as a strict prerequisite to its subject matter jurisdiction. 49
45. 522 F.2d at 832.
46. Id. at 830 n.7, quoting Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,
314 (1945).
47. 11 BNA FAn EmaL. PRAc. CAs. 392 (S.D. Ind. 1975).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 394.
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When the plaintiff failed to meet the limit, she lost her right of
action and the court lost its power to hear the case. The question
was not removal of a bar to the defendant's liability as it had been
in Davis. The defendant simply ceased to be liable when the
plaintiff failed to meet the 90-day limitation.
Even in Bottoms, however, there is the suggestion that the
plaintiff could have preserved her claim if she had shown "the
required diligence" in either the state or the federal forum.50
Since subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or extended by
either party, it seems odd to suggest that the plaintiff's diligent,
albeit misguided, attempt to comply with the statute could create
or extend that jurisdiction. The suggestion is more in keeping with
the equitable considerations that surround the application of stat-
utes of limitations.
Only one court to date has directly rejected the suggestion that
the "timely filing" requirement is jurisdictional. In Reeb v. Eco-
nomic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc.,1 the plaintiff's employment was
terminated on September 24, 1969. However, she did not file
charges of sex discrimination with the EEOC until April 28, 1970,
seven months later. Despite the excuse that she had not learned
that the discharge was discriminatory until that time, the district
court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The defendant's motion to dismiss was granted because the plain-
tiff had failed to meet the "jurisdictional prerequisite" by filing
suit within 90 days of the allegedly discriminatory act.52 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that the 90-day requirement was not a
jurisdictional prerequisite, but rather a statute of limitations.53
The court noted that the 90-day filing period should be con-
sidered an administrative requirement having reference only to
charges filed with the EEOC. "In terms [of the Act], at least, it
had nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the United States district
courts over a suit later authorized by the EEOC." 5 In applying
the requirement, the court pointed out that other courts have
frequently resorted to common law equitable doctrines such as
waiver, estoppel, and tolling "to prevent an injustice which might
50. Id.
51. 11 BNA FAro EuPL. PRic. CAs. 234 (N.D. Ga. 1974), ree'd, 516 F.2d
924 (5th Cir. 1975).
52. 11 BNA FAmr EMPL. Phmc. CAs. 234 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
53. 516 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1975).
54. Id. at 926.
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otherwise be worked by a literal application of the statute." 5
For instance, courts have applied the tolling principle to cases of
continuing discrimination, 56 and to cases in which the employee
sought to pursue his claim under grievance procedures established
by a labor contract before filing with the EEOC.57 The Reeb court
concluded as follows:
The ratio decidendi, however, of the leading cases dealing
with timing requirements in general under the Act com-
pels the conclusion that the ninety day requirement is not
"jurisdictional" in the sense that compliance with it vel
non determines the jurisdiction of the district court, with-
out respect to any of the other circumstances in a particu-
lar case. We accept the view that the requirement should
be analogized to statutes of limitations. Equitable modi-
fications, such as tolling and estoppel, that are applied to
them should also be applied here. 8
Applying these equitable doctrines to the facts, the court in Reeb
held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until it
was apparent or should have been apparent to a reasonably pru-
dent person that there had been an act of discrimination. 59 This
construction was supported by the defendant's failure to claim
any prejudice to its cause because of the later filing date, and by
the court's finding that the claim was not stale.6 0 The court alterna-
tively indicated that the defendant may have been estopped from
asserting the statute of limitations by its alleged concealment of
the discrimination from the plaintiff.61 These considerations are
common concerns of a court of equity in detiding whether to toll
a statute of limitations.
The Fifth Circuit in Reeb relied upon the Supreme Court's
decision in Love v. Pullman Co.62 Although Love did not concern
the time period for filing with the EEOC, it did set guidelines for
interpreting the statutory prerequisites of a private Title VII suit
equitably, as procedural matters.
55. Id. at 927.
56. See Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969).
57. See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
58. 516 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1975).
59. Id. at 931.
60. Id. at 930.
61. Id.
62. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
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In Love, the plaintiff sent the EEOC a 'letter of inquiry"
charging racial discrimination instead of first filing a complaint with
the state FEP commission as required by the Act. In accordance
with its custom, the EEOC referred the matter to the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission. The Colorado Commission returned the
complaint to the EEOC without taking any action, and the EEOC
automatically filed it at that time. The court of appeals dismissed
the suit because the plaintiff had not "ified" the charge himself
with the Colorado Commission, as prescribed by the Act.63 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the EEOC practice of keep-
ing a complaint in "suspended animation," i.e., holding it without
formally filing, "fully complied with the intent of the Act."64 The
Court said that since the defendant had not demonstrated any
prejudice to its interests, "Itlo require a second 'filing' by the
aggrieved party after termination of state proceedings would serve
no purpose other than the creation of an additional procedural
technicality. Such technicalities are particularly inappropriate in
a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers,
initiate the process." 65
Several cases after Love speak of this practice-holding a
charge suspended when it is first filed with the EEOC and then
referring it to a state agency-as "tolling" the time period.66 How-
ever, tolling is an equitable doctrine that is used to apply statutes
of limitations, not to expand jurisdiction. It is reasonable to infer
from these cases that the timely filing requirement is not really
jurisdictional. It is in fact a statute of limitations which is sub-
ject to all the equitable considerations normally applied to such
statutes.
2. Filing Suit
The second "jurisdictional" requirement in a private Title VII
suit is that the plaintiff receive and act upon the Commission's
statutory notice. The private plaintiff has 90 days after receipt of
the notice to file suit in federal court.67
63. Love v. Pullman Co., 430 F.2d 49, 52-53 (10th Cir. 1970), citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (d) (1970).
64. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525 (1972).
65. Id. at 526-27.
66. Richard v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 469 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1972);
Vigil v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 455 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1972); Anderson
v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., Inc., 464 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1972).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
1976]
384 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
An analysis of the courts' handling of the two-letter notification
system that was employed by the EEOC until last year will demon-
strate the difficulties created by describing the notice requirement
as jurisdictional.68 The pertinent provision of Title VII is as follows:
If a charge filed with the Comniission pursuant to subsec-
tion (b) [of this section] is dismised by the Commission,
or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing
of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference
under subsection (c) or (d), whichever is later, the Com-
mission has not ified a civil action under this section . ..
or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation
agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the
Commission ...shall so notify the person aggrieved and
within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil
action may be brought against the respondent named in
the charge .... 69
The EEOC practice was to wait to issue notice, regardless of
the length of time, until one of the following occurred: dismissal
of the charge, failure of conciliation, or determination not to file
suit. Upon the occurrence of one of these facts, the EEOC would
issue a letter advising the charging party of the Commission's
disposition of the case and further informing him that he could
then request a "Notice of Right-to-Sue." On receipt of this second
letter, the complainant was informed he had only 90 days in
which to fie suit. This procedure was developed to "allow a
charging party the option of either requesting the right to sue
immediately ...or waiting indefinitely to see whether the Com-
mission [would] sue the respondent itself."70 The charging party
could request his Notice of Right-to-Sue after 180 days, whether
or not the Commission had disposed of his case,7' but the EEOC
did not publicize this option except through its regulations.
This procedure has caused controversy. In DeMatteis v. East-
man Kodak Co.,72 the complainant's charge was dismissed by the
EEOC because it found no reasonable cause to believe the charge,
68. This practice has been abandoned by the Commission. New Develop-
ments, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH EMIL. PRACTICES 'GtUDE f 5318
(1975).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
70. Harris v. Sherwood Medical Indus., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1149, 1155
(E.D. Mo. 1974).
71. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b, c (1974).
72. 511 F.2d 306, reaff'd and modified, 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975).
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and the Commission so notified the complainant by letter on May
8, 1973. The notice of dismissal, however, also advised DeMat-
teis that his 90-day period for filing suit would not begin to run
until he requested, and received a second letter, a Notice of Right-
to-Sue, from the EEOC. Consequently, the complainant's attorney
delayed requesting the second letter until July 26, 1973. The suit
was finally filed on October 3, 1973, far beyond 9(Y days from the
first letter of May 8th, but within 90 days of the date the Bight-
to-Sue letter was requested.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals adhered to the jurisdic-
tional ,formula. In its initial opinion, the court held that the first
letter gave sufficient notice to begin running the 90-day time
limit, because the EEOC regulations did not require a formal
Notice of Bight-to-Sue for dismissal of charges. The purpose of
the special notice was "definitely to fix a time when the admini-
strative remedies had ended"7 3 in cases that the EEOC had
processed beyond the investigatory stage. Since it was evident
that this dismissal had definitely ended the Commission's processes,
there was no need for a more complete notification. The court
expressed concern that since there was no limit on the time when
the second letter must be requested and sent, a contrary holding
would enable the Commission and the charging party to extend
the 90-day period indefinitely by postponing its beginning.74
However, it became evident on rehearing that the complainant
had been misled by his reliance on the EEOC's instructions. With-
out abandoning its jurisdictional formulation, the court decided
that in fairness to the plaintiff it must apply equitable principles
to suspend the 90-day requirement.75 The court allowed the case
to proceed to trial on the merits, but limited the precedential effect
of its decision to cases begun within 90 days of its original opin-
ion. 6 The decision reflects an equitable consideration which might
well be a factor in construing a statute of limitations, but it is not
an appropriate jurisdictional standard. As the court said in its
earlier opinion, "[t]he jurisdiction of the federal court is carefully
guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation."7 7
73. Id. at 310.
74. Id. at 311.
75. DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 520 F.2d 409, reaff'g and modifying
511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1975).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 311, quoting American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17
(1951).
1976]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The flexibility afforded the charging party in DeMatteis has not
been universally provided. A recent series of district court de-
cisions, following the reasoning of Harris v. Sherwood Medical
Industries, Inc.,78 has interpreted the filing requirement much more
strictly.79
In Harris, the first notice received by the complainant was of
the Commission's failure to conciliate. Nevertheless, the court
held that this was the only notice necessary under the Act, and
that once such notice was given the 90-day period in which the
individual must bring suit began to run. The court also said it
was not necessary to inform the plaintiff that she had only 90 days
to bring suit. 'Vhile the furnishing of such additional informa-
tion may well be desirable, it is not a necessary element of notice
under the statute." s0
The Harris opinion demonstrates the effect of a strictly juris-
dictional approach to the filing requirement. The court ignored
the plaintiff's reliance upon the instructions of the EEOC. The
court also ignored the information supplied by the EEOC regard-
ing the number of pending cases in which plaintiffs had similarly
relied and would be adversely affected by a dismissal.s Its only
concern was that the notice given had satisfied the statutory pur-
pose-not "to advise prospective litigants of their legal rights, but
merely to announce [that] the administrative remedies set forth
in the statute have been exhausted." 82
However, one might question whether administrative remedies
were, in fact, exhausted in Harris. The court did not deal with
this question satisfactorily. The cases it cited8" all concerned ac-
tions under the 1964 Act when the Commission did not have the
power to bring suit. Prior to the amendments, if the EEOC failed
to conciliate, its processes were at an end. However, after the
1972 amendments the EEOC could file suit itself if conciliation
efforts failed.
78. 386 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
79. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soe'y, 10 BNA FAm EmPL. PsAc. CAS. 1268
(S.D. Cal. 1975); Mungen v. Choctaw, Inc., 10 BNA FAm EbL. PnAC. CAS.
1345 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp., 11 BNA FAmr EMPL.
PRAc. CAS. 145 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
80. 386 F. Supp. at 1153.
81. Id. at 1151-52.
82. Id. at 1155. See notes 122-26 infra and accompanying text.
83. 386 F. Supp. at 1153-54.
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The overriding concern of the Harris court was that the EEOC
not be allowed to arbitrarily extend the 90-day limitation. Al-
though this is a valid concern, the court's solution was directly
contrary to previous case law. The opinions cited by the Harris
court to support its strict jurisdictional approach had held that
"recognized equitable grounds" could serve to toll the statutory
time limit for filing suit.84
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has effectively overruled
Harris in Tuft v. McDonnell Dougas Corp.8 The fact pattern in
Tuft was similar to that of Harris. The plaintiff first received a letter
from the EEOC advising her that conciliation efforts in her case
had failed, and that she could request a Right-to-Sue letter at any
time. The letter suggested that she first retain a lawyer since after
receiving the second letter, the Right-to-Sue letter, she would
have only 90 days in which to fie suit. She filed her action a few
days after receiving the second letter but more than 90 days after
receiving the first letter. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion for
two reasons.
First, the Eighth Circuit agreed that the purpose of the notifi-
cation requirement is to fix a definite point in time at which ad-
ministrative remedies have been exhausted so that the 90-day limi-
tation period for filing a private suit can begin to run.86 Unlike
the district court in Harris, the Tuft court did not believe that the
administrative remedies were exhausted until the EEOC had deter-
mined whether or not to file suit Therefore, no notice was re-
quired until such a determination was made, and if notice of failure
of conciliation were given, it would not be sufficient to begin the
90-day period. The court's holding was based upon a review of
the legislative history of Title VII from which it reasoned that
Congress had intended the EEOC to have the primary duty of
enforcing the Act. The court concluded that the agency should
be given as long a time as necessary to reach a final disposition of
the charge.
However, in Ms. Tufts case, which was not atypical, the EEOC
had the case for over two years before it announced that concilia-
84. Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,' 469 F.2d 268, 269 (4th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 939 (1973). See also cases cited in Harris v.
Sherwood Medical Indus., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1149, 1153 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
85. 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 782 (1976).
86. Id. at 1308, quoting Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d
1136, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971).
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tion efforts had failed. Under the Tuft decision, the EEOC did
not need to issue any notice upon failure of conciliation; it could
have held up the case indefinitely until it made a determination
not to file suit, or until Ms. Tuft requested a Notice of Right-to-
Sue of her own initiative.
Second, the court evaluated the quality of notification given by
the first letter. That letter explicitly informed the plaintiff that the
90-day limitation period, which the court characterized as a statute
of limitations,87 would not begin to run until she received the second
letter. Therefore, the first letter could not constitute effective
notice: "Since the first letter did not give Ms. Tuft any effective
notification that she could sue within 90 days of the receipt of
that letter, it cannot serve to initiate the running of the statute of
limitations." 88 The court also considered factors such as the plain-
tiffs reliance on the EEOC procedures and the failure of the de-
fendant to demonstrate prejudice as important in reaching an
equitable solution to the controversy.89
The problem with the first argument, that notice need not
issue until administrative remedies have been exhausted, is that it
is based upon a faulty reading of the statute. The statutory
language requires that the Commission "shall so notify" the claim-
ant in either of two cases: (1) if a charge is dismissed; or (2)
after 180 days if the Commission has not filed a civil action or
entered into a conciliation agreement. 90 The plain implication of
this section is that some notice shall issue after the Commission
has had 180 days to consider the case, regardless of the progress
of the proceedings. The Tuft court's interpretation, however, was
that the EEOC need not notify the aggrieved party until it had
either dismissed the case or made a determination not to fie suit
This inconsistency will be dealt with at greater length in the fol-
lowing discussion.
The court's second argument, that notification must be actual
to be effective, is consistent with prior case law. In Franks v. Bow-
87. Id. at 1309-10.
88. Id. at 1310.
89. "Moreover, it is undisputed that Ms. Tuft relied on the Commission's
procedures, and in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, she should not be
penalized for any errors or omissions of the EEOC." Id. (footnotes omitted).
See also DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, reaff'd as modified,
520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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man Transportation Co.,91 for example, the Bight-to-Sue letter was
delivered to the complainant's house, but he proved that he had
never personally received it. In accordance with the majority
view that the statutory notice must be "actual and effective" to
begin the running of the (then)'30-day period, the Fifth Circuit
held that the 30-day period for filing suit did not begin until a
second letter was actually received by the plaintiff a year later.92
The Franks court refers to the time requirement as a "statutory
limitation period" 93 rather than as a jurisdictional requirement.
In terms of the policy behind limitations periods generally,
the claimant can hardly be said to have slept on his rights
if he allows the thirty-day period to expire in ignorance
of his right to sue.... Congress did not intend to condi-
tion a claimant's right to sue under Title VII on fortuitous
circumstances or events beyond his control which are not
spelled out in the statute.9
While both Tuft and Franks styled the 90-day filing period as
a statute of limitations, DeMatteis termed it a jurisdictional pre-
requisite. In application, however, all three courts looked to the
same factor-effectiveness of notification-as the final criterion
that triggered the time period on the basis that any other reading
would be unfair, or "inequitable" to the plaintiff. The "equities"
plainly should not be considerations in determining subject matter
jurisdiction.
While these courts have all used different language to describe
the two private suit requirements, filing a timely charge and
promptly acting upon notification by the EEOC, they have uni-
formly treated the requirements as statutes of limitations, with all
the consequences implied by that label. This treatment is prob-
ably the correct one, since it comports best with the statutory pur-
pose and with the treatment the Supreme Court has afforded to
similar provisions in other "remedial" statutes.
91. 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), re'd on other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1251
(1976).
92. Id. at 404. See also Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d
1301, 1310 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 782 (1976); Taylor v.
Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 394 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. IMI. 1975).
93. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976).
94. Id. at 404.
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B. Other Remedial Statutes
In its interpretation of similar statutory time limits in other
federal statutes, the Supreme Court has used principles of laches
and tolling to ensure equitable application of the statutory limita-
tion periods. In Burnett v. N.Y. Central Railroad Co.,95 the Court
said that the three-year limitation period of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act was tolled when the plaintiff instituted suit in a state
court, even though venue was later found to be improper and the
state case was dismissed. The plaintiff's subsequent federal court
suit was technically barred by the FELA three-year limit. The
Court, however, took the position that "the basic inquiry is whether
congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the statute of limita-
tions in given circumstances. In order to determine congressional
intent, we must examine the purposes and policies underlying the
limitation provision, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme
developed for enforcement of the rights given by the Act."90
The general purposes of statutes of limitations are to put the
defendant on notice and to relieve courts of the problem of hear-
ing stale claims because the plaintiff has "slept on his rights." 97
These policies are "frequently outweighed, however, where the
interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff's rights."9
Special consideration is due a plaintiff who has been misled or
otherwise prevented from bringing his suit in time.99
The Court reached a similar decision under the Sherman Act
in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.100 The defendant
in that case claimed that the statute of limitations was a "sub-
stantive" requirement of the claim and could not be extended by
"procedural" rules.' 0' The Court rejected the substantive/pro-
cedural distinction. Instead it said that the test should be "whether
tolling the limitation in a given context is consonant with the
legislative scheme,"' 0 2 and that traditional equitable principles
should apply in deciding when to toll the statute. 03
95. 380 U.S. 424 (1965).
96. Id. at 427. Cf. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
97. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
98. id.
99. Id. at 428-29.
100. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
101. Id. at 556-57.
102. Id. at 558.
103. Id. at 559.
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While it is difficult to cull a specific intent from the legislative
history of Title VII, the general intent is clear. "Congress neither
intended, nor should the courts permit an impoverished 'private
attorney general'. . . to be saddled with procedures which might
seriously impede the vindication of the civil rights laws. The
procedures of Title VII were not intended as 'a stumbling block
to the accomplishment of the statutory objective.'" 104 The "juris-
dictional" approach espoused by the majority of courts sharply
conflicts with this objective. A more reasonable approach would
be the equitable one used by the Supreme Court to construe simi-
lar statutory limitations periods. Since it appears that in actual
fact the majority of courts are already using this standard, if the
language were brought in line with the treatment, much of the
confusion in this area would be alleviated.
C. Preserving the Statutory Timae Scheme
If, as it appears from the case law, the Title VII time limita-
tions on private suits are in the nature of statutes of limitations
and not jurisdictional limitations, are we not then left with the
dilemma feared by the Harris court: Will the EEOC be able to
expand the statutory time frame indefinitely by withholding its
Notice of Right-to-Sue until it has completed its procedures?
Surely Congress could not have intended to allow so detailed a
procedural plan to be so easily distorted. The preservation of the
time plan by the 1972 amendments was purposeful; in fact two
basic controls are built into its workings.
The first limitation is the doctrine of judicial discretion. Merely
because a statute is "remedial" does not signal that its limitations
periods may be ignored. Liberal construction should not be
equated with judicial license to rewite the statute. 05 Only "recog-
nized equitable grounds" can toll a statute of limitations, and, in
spite of some language to the contrary, the courts have consistently
recognized and applied this rule in Title VII cases. 06
The second check appears in the statute itself. The discussion
of Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.'1 noted the specific statutory
requirement that the EEOC "shall . . . notify" the complainant
104. McQueen v. E.M.C. Plastic Co., 302 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Tex.
1969). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974).
105. EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 991 (D. Md. 1974).
106. Goodman v. City Prods. Corp., 425 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1970).
107. 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 782 (1976).
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of his right to file suit 180 days after the charge is filed.'0 Although
this requirement has generally been ignored by the courts,10 9 it is
as essential to the time plan of Title VII as any of the other
limitations periods.
In spite of the confusion surrounding the legislative history of
Title VII, Congress was clearly concerned that the private litigant
have quick and easy access to relief." 0 The Act mandates that the
Commission, on its own initiative, notify the complainant 180 days
after the charge was fied if it has failed to either reach a concili-
ation agreement or file suit."' Originally, the EEOC complied
strictly with this directive." 2 However, the present regulations
provide for notification in 180 days only if it is requested by the
charging party." 3 Otherwise notice is not issued until a dispositive
decision has been reached on the case: i.e., there has been a find-
ing of no reasonable cause, conciliation efforts have failed, or a
decision has been made not to file suit." 4 Most courts have upheld
the EEOC regulations on the rationale" 5 that the charging party
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(Supp. IV, 1974). See note 90 supra and
accompanying text.
109. In EEOC v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co., 521 F.2d 1364 (8th Cir. 1975),
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly held that the EEOC was not
required to issue notice unless the complainant requested it. The court relied
on the dictum in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975), to support its holding. However, the Johnson decision only holds
that the "claimant . . . may demand the right-to-sue letter." Id. at 458.
The opinion does not specifically deal with the question of whether the EEOC
should issue the letter without a request.
110. The retention of the private right of action, as amended,
is designed to make sure that the person aggrieved does not have
to endure lengthy delays if the Commission or the Attorney Gen-
eral does not act with due diligence and speed. Accordingly, the
provisions described above allow the person aggrieved to elect to
pursue his or her own remedy under this title .. It is hoped
that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception and not
the rule. . . . However, . . . it is necessary that all avenues be
left open for quick and effective relief.
118 CoNeG. REc. 593 (remarks of Senator Dominick); id. at 732 (remarks of
Senator Brock).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974); 5 UrrED STAT.S COM-
MISSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CrvIL RIGHTS ENFoacas ENT EFFORT
519 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CIvu. RIGHTS REPORT].
112. Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b (1974).
114. Id. §§ 1601.19, 1601.19b, 1601.25, 1601.25b(b), 1601.25c.
115. See Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975);
Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974); Stebbins v.
Continental Ins. Co., 442 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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would otherwise be forced to choose between filing a private suit
immediately, perhaps missing the chance to conciliate the case,
and waiting for a possible EEOC-instituted suit at a later date.116
However, this procedure dearly denies the charging party a pro-
cedural right that was established by the Act. It is unrealistic to
assume that the right to request notice is a replacement, since
many, if not most, complainants are ignorant of that right, and,
judging from the reported cases, most do not retain a private -attor-
ney until instructed to do so by the Commission's Notice of Right-
to-Sue. "By ignoring the provisions [of the Act], and not at least
informing charging parties of their fight to request notices, EEOC
has effectively denied this alternative to the thousands of indi-
viduals whose charges are caught up in its backlog."", 7
Such unfettered expansion of the Title VII time frames by the
EEOC also prejudices the defendant. For instance, although the
Act establishes a two-year limitation on back-pay awards,"18 the
time it takes the EEOC to investigate the charge and conciliate
or file suit is added to this. Thus, the total liability period for
one employee may be five to nine years. 19 The legislative history
indicates that Congress was concerned with this problem: "The
conferees spent considerable time dealing with the detailed pro-
visions covering the procedure for filing and processing charges
of discrimination brought by individuals who feel they have been
unfairly treated because of their race or their .sex. An effort was
made to insure a speedy and equitable resolution of such charges
which is in the interest of both the employee and the respondent
employer or labor union."120
Expansion of limitation periods creates an additional problem
for the parties and for the court-the evidence of discrimination is
stale by the time a suit finally comes to trial. In cases where dis-
crimination is a continuing problem, the EEOC could alleviate
116. Id. at 846. It is not necessary that the Commission make a finding of
reasonable cause before a private party can institute suit or that it actually
attempt a conciliation. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line M.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 406
F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971).
117. COvm Ric--s REPonRT 521.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV, 1974).
119. Schneider, The Unprotected Minority: Employers and Civil Rights
Compliance, 49 LA. Bn BuLL. 458, 460 (1974).
120. 118 CoNG. REc. 7563 (remarks of Senator Perkins) (1972).
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some of the difficulty by filing new charges at a later date and
thus base the judicial hearing on fresh incidents and evidence.2 1
In spite of these difficulties, some courts have specifically ruled
that notice should not issue until the Commission has completed
its processes.122 Until that time, the complainant has not "exhausted
his administrative remedies" since the EEOC may still bring
suit.123 Other courts, however, have held that the plaintiff exhausts
his administrative remedies merely by filing his charge and await-
ing the advice of the EEOC, since that is all he can personally do.2 4
These arguments confuse "exhaustion of remedies" with "primary
enforcement." The Civil Rights Act only requires that the EEOC
be given first chance to pursue a charge of employment discrimina-
tion. There is no requirement that administrative remedies be ex-
hausted before the claimant can bring a private suit. In fact, the
language of the Act suggests that there will be cases in which the
administrative processes are incomplete at the end of the 180 days
by unconditionally allowing the complainant to file suit at that
time.125 The EEOC regulations implicitly recognize this possibility
by allowing -the charging party to request notice after 180 days
regardless of what stage the proceedings have reached.12 6
Clearly the procedure of delaying notification until the Commis-
sion has made a final disposition of the case does not comport with
the Act. A change is called for so that after 180 days every claimant
would receive notification of his right to fie suit' 27 This procedure
would eliminate much of the litigation that has arisen because of
the uncertainty of both plaintiffs and attorneys over interpretation
of statutory limitations. It would also speed up conciliation talks
by encouraging defendants to settle rather than delay. Hope that
a long delay would cause the plaintiff to lose interest would be
undermined if a court suit were foreseeable in six months. If the
complainant failed to ifie suit within the time period, the Commis-
sion could still sue at a later date.
121. EEOC v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 579, 584 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
122. Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1,975).
See also Taylor v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 394 F. Supp. 72, 74 (N.D.
M11. 1975).
123. Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301, 1309 (8th Cir.
1975).
124. Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1969);
Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
126. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b (1974).
127. Ci,. RIxcrrs REPORT 669.
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Unlike the private suit, which can be filed only within the 90-day
period following notification from the Commission, there is no ex-
press statutory limitation on the time in which the EEOC may
bring suit.1 28 The four circuit courts that have considered the ques-
tion 1" have refused to infer a 180-day limitation from the notice
requirement in section 5(f).1s3 In reaching this conclusion, much
weight was given to the Commission's conciliatory function. Al-
though the legislative history of Title VII indicates that conciliation
is the preferred method of enforcing fair employment practices,13'
a heavy backlog makes it virtually impossible for the Commission
to reach an agreement within 180 days.132 This would appear to
bolster the arguments for inferring a 180-day limitation on an
EEOC suit on the same grounds used to justify allowing the private
suit after 180 days.133 However, no statutory language supports a
time limit on an EEOC suit. Congress knew how to write a statute
of limitations since it so clearly limited the private action; to imply
a limitation where none exists would be sheer judicial fabrication.
The overwhelming majority of courts have rightly refused to do
this.134
IV. THm EEOC Surr
As with the private suit, the statutory procedure by which the
EEOC may file suit is aimed at protecting the rights of the parties.
The problem, however, is less difficult than in the private suit be-
cause there are no offsetting equities created by the presence of a
layman/plaintiff. Here the plaintiff is the EEOC, an agency with
expertise in employment law.
128. EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153, 156-57 (4th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975).
129. Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975);
EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 505 F.2d 610
(5th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1974).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). See note 129 supra.
131. "Only if conciliation proves to be impossible do we expect the Com-
mission to bring an action in federal district court to seek enforcement."
EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1357 (6th Cir. 1975), citing
118 CONG. REc. 7563 (remarks of Senator Perkins) (1972).
132. Crvi. RicF s REPORT 529-32.
133. See EEOC v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
134. For listing of decisions pro and con, see EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 n.5 (6th Cir. 1975).
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The cases have extracted five "conditions precedent" from the
procedure outlined in the Act: (1) a charge must be filed; (2) a
notice of the charge must be served on the employer, employment
agency, or labor organization that is the object of the complaint
within 10 days of the filing; (3) there must be an investigation of
the charge; (4) there must be a determination of reasonable cause;
(5) the EEOC must attempt a conciliation. 3 5 These five proce-
dural steps are designed to protect the defendant's rights in two
ways: first, by insuring that the charged party has notification of
the investigation, and second, by insuring that the EEOC considers
the charges and attempts conciliation before seeking judicial re-
lief. 3 6 Of these five steps, the latter four are peculiarly within the
control of the EEOC, while the first step, filing the charge, may be
accomplished either by or on behalf of an aggrieved individual, or
by the Commission. Nonetheless, the completion of each of these
conditions must be alleged in the judicial complaint upon filing
suit. 3
7
Contrary to the judicial interpretation of procedural prerequisites
in private suits,138 most courts have held that the conditions prece-
dent to the filing of a federal suit by the EEOC are procedural,
and not jurisdictional. In an unusually lucid and well reasoned
opinion, Judge Collinson 19 explained the difference between sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and procedural conditions precedent:
Federal jurisdiction [for civil rights cases] is based on 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1343 (4) (1970) [not on the Civil Rights Act]:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any
person:
135. EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 505 F.2d 610, 617 (5th Cir.
1974); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907, 916 (D. Md.
1974), rev'd in part and affd in part, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976).
136. EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907, 916 (D. Md.
1974).
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(c). A general pleading that "all conditions prece-
dent to the commencement of the action" have been fulfilled is sufficient to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement under Rule 9(c). Id. EEOC v. Wah
Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Standard
Forge & Axle Co., 496 F.2d 1392, 1393 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1106 (1974); EEOC v. United Aircraft Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1313, 1315
(D. Conn. 1974).
138. See notes 21-30 supra and accompanying text.
139. EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 362 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
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(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other
relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protec-
tion of civil rights, including the right to vote."
This of course, is known as "federal question" jurisdic-
tion and is derived from Article III, section 2 of the Con-
stitution.140
If a complaint alleges violation of the Civil Rights Act, the federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, the
complainant fails to meet the conditions precedent listed in the Act,
the complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, but not for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. As long as the complaint is properly drawn to seek
recovery based on a violation of Title VII, judicial inquiry into the
plaintiff's satisfaction of the conditions precedent requires a judg-
ment on the merits.1 41  If, however, the conditions precedent are
not met, the "equity" court has power to deny the EEOC relief
and give judgment against it on the merits.14
This further explanation was offered by a Florida district court:' 4
"[C]ivil litigation under Title VII is essentially equitable in nature
to be tried 'through the exercise of the court's discretion, not by
a jury'." '4 On this basis, the court reached the same result as
Judge Collinson-failure of the conditions precedent did not affect
the court's subject matter jurisdiction. However, the question of
whether the conditions precedent have been met is a proper sub-
ject of judicial inquiry, 45 and may be the basis of a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56 or a motion for dismissal for
140. Id. at 789.
141. Id. See also EEOC v. Standard Forge & Axle Co., 496 F.2d 1392,
1395 (5th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 991 (D.
Md. 1974).
142. The view that Title VII claims are essentially "equitable" in nature
and must be governed by equitable considerations has been espoused in other
opinions. In EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 309 (6th Cir.
1975), petition for cert. fled 44 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1975) (No.
75-393), the court said that "[wihile affirmative action may not be limited to
the reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay, we believe
that it is limited to relief of the same general kind, that is, equitable relief in
the form of restitution." See also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, 516
F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974); McQueen v. E.M.C. Plastic Co.,
302 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Tex. 1969).
143. EEOC v. Air Guide Corp., 395 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
144. Id. at 605.
145. EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 362 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
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failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted under Rule
12(b). The conditions precedent out of which most procedural
litigation has arisen are notice, investigation and conciliation.
A. Notice
The original 1964 Civil Bights Act contained no time limit dur-
ing which the charged party had to be notified that a complaint
had been filed. Although the Act did require that a copy of the
charge at some time be furnished to the charged party,1 46 it was
not until the 1972 amendments that Congress added the require-
ment that the charged party be notified within 10 days after a
complaint was filed with the EEOC. 47 The cases have held that
the EEOC's failure to notify the defendant does not preclude the
claimant's personal cause of action, since "the individual's right to
bring a statutorily conferred right of action should not depend upon
doing certain acts beyond his knowledge or control." ' 48 However,
suits brought by the Commission are treated more strictly, and
failure to notify may be grounds for summary judgment
In EEOC v. Air Guide Corp.,49 the court listed the notice re-
quirement as a "condition precedent" to a suit by the EEOoC' 50
that is necessary in order to insure due process to the charged
party.151 The court argued that "[t]he natural effect of a failure to
receive notice is plainly prejudicial to the respondent;" 152 therefore,
such a failure should not be regarded as a mere technical error
despite the absence of evidence of actual prejudice. Furthermore,
the EEOC, which in this case broke its own procedural rules by
failing to notify, was given the burden of showing that the defend-
ant was not thereby prejudiced.153
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). See IBEW v. EEOC, 398 F.2d 248, 252 (3d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969); U.S. Steel Corp. v. EEOC,
6 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 8980 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 1396
(3d Cir. 1973); Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
148. Healen v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 9 CCH ENTL. PaAc. DEC. 10,023,
7237 (N.D. Ga. 1973); see Foye v. United A.G. Stores Cooperative, Inc.,
336 F. Supp. 82 (D. Neb. 1972).
149. 395 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
150. Id. at 603, citing EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.2d 944 (8th
Cir. 1974); EEOC v. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321 (D.
Del. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975).
151. EEOC v. Air Guide Corp., 395 F. Supp. 600, 603 (S.D. Fla. 1975).




While it is probably impossible for the EEOC to investigate a
charge without the defendant's awareness, notions of basic fairness
require that he be informed of the exact charges. Even without
reference to such notions of fairness, the language of the Act leaves
no room for deviation. The notice requirement is a basic procedural
safeguard: the defendant cannot be summarily deprived of it with-
out affecting his position in the proceedings.
B. Investigation
Title VII gives the EEOC broad investigatory powers once a
charge has been filed. Thus, in the words of one commentator,
"even an absurd, blatantly and maliciously false complaint can
bring an EEOC investigation into every phase of an employer's
employment practices."154
In EEOC v. Western Publishing Co., Inc., 55 the charging party
had originally complained only of receiving bad job references be-
cause of her race. The Eighth Circuit held that the EEOC was
entitled to discover all evidence relevant to salaries, promotions,
discharges, hiring, and references. The expanded scope of investi-
gation was permitted because discrimination in all these areas was
claimed two years after the original filing in a final, perfected
charge.'; 6 But even in cases in which the original charge has not
been subsequently expanded, the EEOC has been afforded broad
investigatory powers. For example, where the aggrieved party ified
a charge relating only to a discriminatory-wage scale, the EEOC
was allowed to investigate hiring practices, job classification, rates
of pay, interdepartmental transfers, and promotions. 157
There have been a few isolated attempts to limit the method
and scope of EEOC investigations. 58  In United States Steel Corp.
154. Schneider, The Unprotected Minority: Employers and Civil Rights
Compliance, 49 L.A. BAR BUwL. 458, 459-60 (1974).
155. 502 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1974).
156. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
157. EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 372 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Mo. 1973),
afd, 507 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1974).
158. EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 793-95 (D. Md.
1974). The EEOC was not authorized to investigate by means of compul-
sory interrogatories, since the Act says only that testimony or documentary
evidence may be compelled through the issuance of a subpoena, the same
procedure which is followed by the NLRB. The EEOC regulations also
support this position. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15 (1974).
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v. EEOC,159 the Pennsylvania district court held that a charge by
one individual of a single incident of discriminatory failure to trans-
fer the complainant to another department was insufficient to sup-
port a broad investigation of all hiring and transfer practices in
every department of the defendant company.160 The court took
the position that such an investigation wrongfully included facts
not "relevant and material to the charge under investigation." ''
This is an unusual case; the majority of courts have upheld broad
investigations on the basis of a single complaint. 12 The Act ap-
pears to encourage this approach, and, in fact, it promotes the most
efficient use of the EEOC's resources, as long as the defendant is
not deprived of procedural safeguards.
A related issue is whether the complaint that is finally filed in
district court is limited to the specific illegality complained of in
the original charge. For instance, where the original charge ified
with the EEOC was one of racial discrimination, some courts have
dismissed a complaint growing out of the same charge alleging
sex discrimination. The current judicial test was stated in Sanchez
v. Standard Brands, Inc.:L63 a complaint under Title VII may
encompass any kind of discrimination like or related to
allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such
allegation during the pendency of the case before the Com-
mission. . . . In other words, the scope of the judicial
complaint is limited to the "scope" of the EEOC investi-
gation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of
the charge of discrimination.164
In Sanchez, the plaintiff's original charge claiming sex discrimi-
nation was later amended to include discrimination because of na-
tional origin. The complaint filed with the court, however, alleged
discrimination because of "race or color." The defendant argued
that only the sex discrimination charge should be litigated. The
court decided that it was unnecessary that "every particular fact
159. 6 CCH EmPL. PRAc. DEC. f[ 8980 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 487 F.2d
1396 (3d Cir. 1973).
160. Id. at 6167-68.
161. Id. at 6168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-8(a), 2000e-9(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
162. See Besser, Recent Developments in Equal Employment Opportunity
Litigation, 22 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 72, 85 & n.85 (1973); Schneider, supra
note 154, at 461 n.23.
163. 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970).
164. Id. at 466, quoting in part King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp.
943 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (Smith, J.).
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alleged in the judicial complaint must have a direct counterpart in
the charge of discrimination .... A charge of discrimination is
not filed as a preliminary to a lawsuit. On the contrary, the pur-
pose of a charge of discrimination is to trigger the investigatory
and conciliatory procedures of the EEOC." ' 65
While it is true that the court in Sanchez was dealing with a
private, individual claim, the same problem could occur in an
EEOC-initiated suit. The plaintiff knew she was the object of
discrimination, but she did not know why. As a result, she did not
properly describe the discrimination in her charge. If judicial
complaints were limited by the conclusions of such inexperienced
plaintiffs, many meritorious claims would be lost. Unfortunately,
the implications of this limitation have not always been recognized
by the courts.
"Regrettably, a trend seems to be developing in some federal
courts ... to overlook the emphasis which the Sanchez court
placed on the EEOC investigation, rather than on the charge, as
the primary determinant of the proper scope of a subsequent civil
action." 166 A number of recent decisions have held that only a
charge that was included in the original complaint can be a proper
subject of the subsequent suit.167 Any other form of discrimination
uncovered by the EEOC investigation must have as its basis a
separate charge fied by the Commission. Although it may be
required by the EEOC regulations, this procedure is not neces-
sitated by the statutory language.1 8 It causes more delays in an
already lengthy process. Furthermore, it does not afford the de-
fendant procedural protection; he is protected by the requirement
that the EEOC find reasonable cause to believe the charges and
that it attempt to conciliate. 169
The original complainant's standing to sue may also limit the
broad investigatory power of the EEOC. In EEOC v. New York
Times Broadcasting Service, Inc.,70 a charge of sex discrimination
165. 431 F.2d at 465-66.
166. EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907, 915 (D. Md.
1974), re'd in part and aff'd in part, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976).
167. EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 11 CCH EWML. PRAc. DEC. II 10,660
(S.D. Miss. 1975); EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757 (W.D.
Va. 1974), rev'd, 532 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Rexall Drug Co.,
9 CCH EmL. PRAc. DEc. f 9936 (E.D. Mo. 1974); EEOC v. New York
Times Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
168. See notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
169. See note 191 infra and accompanying text.
170. 364 F, Supp. 651 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
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filed by a white female was the basis of a judicial complaint charg-
ing sex as well as racial bias by the defendant The court held
that the EEOC could only maintain an action if its complaint
could have been brought by the charging party. Since a white
female would not have had standing to raise the issue of racial
discrimination, the EEOC was barred from raising that issue.
Besides its determination on standing the New York Times
court also held, under the Sanchez test, that race discrimination
was not "like or related to" sex discrimination, even though the
charges all arose out of the same investigation. Similarly, the
original complainant's charge in EEOC v. Rexall Drug Co. 7, al-
leged unlawful discharge on the basis of race, but the complaint
eventually filed in the district court by the EEOC also alleged sex
discrimination. The court held that the judicial complaint was not
"reasonably related" to the original charge fied with the Commis-
sion, and so had to be stricken.
Although in New York Times the court suggested that the
'EEOC's investigation on its face [had] apparently failed to
show"172 the racial discrimination which it alleged, neither the
New York Times nor the Rexall Drug decisions disputed the EEOC's
power to make the investigations. Instead the dismissals were
granted on the premise that the original charge, rather than the
EEOC investigation, should be the basis for the judicial complaint.
This was directly contrary to the conclusion in Sanchez.
A Missouri district court, however, went even further. In
EEOC v. Hickey-MitcheU,173 where a black female had filed a
charge of race discrimination, Judge Nagle held that the EEOC
could not bring an action charging sex discrimination against the
same defendant. Even though the evidence had been gathered
during the investigation of the original complaint, and the com-
plainant would have had standing to raise both issues, the court
refused to allow the sex discrimination theory. The court gave no
explanation for this holding, other than a citation to a 1970 Colorado
district court decision.174 In the earlier case, the suit was dismissed
because the complainant alleged religious discrimination for the
171. 9 CCH EmPL. PnAc. DEC. 7 9936 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
172. EEOC v. New York Times Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 364 F. Supp.
641, 654 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
173. 372 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aft'd, 507 F.2d 944 (8th Cir.
1974).
174. Fix v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 320 F. Supp. 58 (D. Colo. 1970).
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first time in his court suit, and the EEOC had only investigated
his charge of discrimination because of national origin. This, how-
ever, was a completely different situation from that in Hickey-
Mitchell, where the EEOC had investigated both charges, thereby
giving the defendant time to dispute the charges and effect a concilia-
tion. Because of this discrepancy, the holding of Hickey-Mitchell
is not persuasive.
Recently the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in EEOC v. Gen-
eral Electric Co.,175 took a firm stand against limiting the scope of
an EEOC court action to the type of discrimination originally
charged. The action grew out of two separate charges, one alleging
racially discriminatory promotions and job transfers, the second al-
leging racial discrimination in employment. The EEOC found
"reasonable cause" as to the first charge only, but during the course
of the investigation it also found reasonable cause to believe that
the defendant had engaged in sex discrimination. Conciliation
efforts failed and the EEOC filed suit charging the defendant with
both race and sex discrimination.1 7  The district court dismissed
the charge of sex discrimination on two grounds: first, since the
charging parties, both males, could not have had standing to raise
the issue of sex-based discrimination, the EEOC also lacked stand-
ing to raise it in a suit based upon those charges; second, the EEOC
failed to follow its own procedural regulations, and such failure
denied the defendant the due process protections to which he was
otherwise entitled.177
The court of appeals reversed. Unlike the lower court, it saw
the charge as merely a "springboard" or a "starting point" from
which the EEOC could begin its investigation. If in the course
of that investigation the Commission obtained evidence of other
forms of discrimination, that evidence could become the basis for
a civil suit without filing a new charge.
In other words, the original charge is sufficient to support
action by the EEOC as well as a civil suit under the Act
for any discrimination stated in the charge itself or devel-
oped in the course of a reasonable investigation of that
charge, provided such discrimination was included in the
175. 532 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1976).
176. The defendant chose not to discuss the charge of sex discrimination
beyond the statement that it was no longer doing its own testing. Id. at 362,
371.
177. EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. Va. 1974).
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reasonable cause determination of the EEOC and was fol-
lowed by conciliation procedures fixed in the Act. 78
The court did not explain exactly what constitutes a "reasonable
investigation." It did state, however, that the "EEOC has the right
during the investigation to compel the production of any material
or evidence that has relevancy to any claim made in the charge." 79
Coupled with the broad powers to amend the charge,i80 this would
seem to give the Commission virtual carte blanche to investigate
and fie suit once a charge has been filed against a defendant For
example, the charge of sex discrimination in General Electric was
based on tests given to prospective employees. Since the de-
fendant made no objection that production of the evidence of the
tests was irrelevant to the original charge, the court found that
that evidence was a proper basis for the subsequent finding of
reasonable cause as to sex discrimination.
On the issue of standing, the court of appeals held that the
EEOC should not be restricted to only those claims which could
have been raised by the complaining party; a suit instituted by
the EEOC does not redress only private wrongs. By the time of
the 1972 amendments, "Congress had come to recognize discrimina-
tion in employment as a 'societal' wrong, calling primarily for
public enforcement . .. " 181 Since the EEOC sues "to vindicate
the public interest," its standing "cannot be controlled or deter-
mined by the standing of the charging party to sue, limited as he
is in rights to the vindication of his own individual rights." 18 2
In so holding, the court was following the lead of two other
circuits: the Sixth Circuit in EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 83
and the Fifth Circuit in EEOC v. Huttig Sash and Door Co.1 8 4
However, not every court has agreed with this reasoning. The
Seventh Circuit, deciding the standing issue in a private class-action
suit,ls 5 followed the very restrictive rule of Hickey-Mitchell.18s It
178. 532 F.2d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 1976).
179. Id. at 364-65.
180. See notes 34-40 supra and accompanying text.
181. 532 F.2d at 372-73.
182. Id. at 373.
183. 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975).
184. 511 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1975).
185. Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 522 F.2d 1235 (7th
Cir. 1975).
186. EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Corp., 372 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Mo.




held that a charge alleging race discrimination could not possibly
be the basis for a judicial complaint alleging sex discrimination,
even if the charging party would have had standing to raise the
second issue.
The court in General Electric also ruled that the EEOC's non-
compliance with its own procedural regulations, by determining
reasonable cause before the defendant was given an opportunity
to comment on the allegations of sex discrimination, would only
bar a suit if the noncompliance actually prejudiced the defendant's
interests. 187 As a practical matter, the defendant had some chance
to be heard during the conciliation proceedings and would have
another chance in the trial de novo in federal court.
The district court in General Electric had ruled that a separate
charge must be filed for each allegation of a different type of dis-
crimination in order to afford the defendant the benefit of the two-
year back-pay liability limitation. Limiting back-pay liability to
two years prior to the filing of the original charge is another proce-
dural protection guaranteed by the Act, but it had been voided by
lengthy time delays between the filing of charges and the final
judgment. 8 8  Although rejecting the argument that a separate
charge must be filed for each allegation in the judicial complaint,
the court of appeals said that a federal court would have discretion
to calculate back-pay liability from the date of the reasonable cause
determination on the new charge instead of from the filing date
of the original charge if there would otherwise be "substantial prej-
udice" to the defendant. In practice, such a ruling would be re-
quired if there were no "countervailing equities."'18 9  The court
theorized that the purpose of the limitation was to give the em-
ployer notice of the claimed discrimination, but if notice of the
charge were not given, a reasonable cause determination would
suffice as long as liability was limited accordingly. This is a novel
and sensible approach which could help to alleviate the problem
of nearly unlimited defendant liability caused by lengthy delays in
EEOC proceedings.
In his. dissent, Chief Judge Widener strongly protested the
EEOC's practice of ignoring its own regulations. According to the
regulations, the defendant is to be notified of a charge and given
a right to respond before there is a determination of reasonable
187. EEOC v. General Elee. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 370-71 (4th Cir. 1976).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV, 1974).
189. 532 F.2d at 371-72.
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cause.1 09 However, the notice procedure established by the regula-
tions may be unnecessary to guarantee due process because the
Commission itself has no enforcement power. The court trial is de
novo; while it is necessary that the Commission make a reasonable
cause determination before it can proceed to a court suit,191 that
determination is not binding on the court. 92  The dissents argu-
ment is further weakened by the facts of this case because the
defendant company was actually given an opportunity to respond,
which it exercised to a limited extent.'
More serious than the failure to notify is the charge that the
EEOC failed to follow its own regulations. The unfairness which
arises when an agency fails to follow its own regulations has been
the subject of considerable controversy' 94  However, most of the
debate has centered around agency enforcement procedures in
quasi-judicial settings. The EEOC has no power of enforcement,
as the majority makes clear, but it does engage in investigations
and produce judgments. Unless the EEOC changes its procedures
the courts must continue to carefully scrutinize its actions to prevent
prejudice to defendants.
C. Conciliation
If the EEOC investigation leads to a determination that there
is reasonable cause to believe the charge of discrimination, the
Commission must "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, concilia-
tion, and persuasion."' 95  The EEOC regulations establish a de-
tailed conciliation plan, but it is not always followed by the Com-
mission. This failure accounts for most of the conciliation problems
that have arisen.
Although there has been general agreement in the courts that
some attempt to conciliate must be made by the EEOC before it
can file suit, 96 once it is clear that conciliation efforts have been
190. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.13, 1601.14 (1974).
191. EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974).
192. Accord, EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975).
193. 532 F.2d at 371.
194. Id. at 379 n.9.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
196. EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md.
1974), rev'd in part and atfd in part, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC
v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974); EEOC v. United
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made the courts do not ordinarily inquire into their quality. For
instance, in EEOC v. RexalZ Drug Co.,'97 the court held that one
telephone conversation between the respondent and an EEOC con-
ciliator was sufficient.198 However, where there has not even been
a minimal attempt at conciliation, the case will be dismissed.
In EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 99 the complain-
ant filed a charge against his employer and his union alleging em-
ployment discrimination. The EEOC determined from its investi-
gation that there was reasonable cause to believe the charges, and
further, that most of the allegedly discriminatory practices were a
product of the collective bargaining agreement between the em-
ployer and the union. However, the Commission failed to include
the union in any of its conciliation efforts. The court held that it
was barred from hearing the case against the union because of the
EEOC's failure to attempt conciliation.
The legislative history of Title VII indicates that court action
was only to be used as a last resort.200 To effectuate this policy, the
court held that the litigable issues in an EEOC suit must be limited
to those issues that had been the subject of conciliation efforts.201
The court also noted that conciliation efforts with the employer
alone were not sufficient, because even though the union had effec-
tive notice of the charges pending, the employer and union were
separate parties with different interests. In any case, mere "notice"
would not satisfy the statutory requirement that a respondent
actually be given a chance to settle before a court suit.
The EEOC regulations have enforced the judicial inference
that the statutory conciliation procedure is a mandatory prerequisite
to suits by the EEOC. In EEOC v. Westvaco Corp.,202 charges of
sex discrimination were ified against the employer and the union.
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Belcher v.
Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Va. 1974); EEOC v.
Container Corp. of America, 352 F. Supp. 262 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
197. 9 CCH EanL. PRAc. DEc. f 9936 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
198. Id. at 6930.
199. 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
200. The Conference Report, which accompanied the House's version of the
1972 Amendments [to Title VII], pxovided:
"The conferees will contemplate that the Commission will con-
tinue to make every effort to conciliate as required by existing law.
Only if conciliation proves to be impossible do we expect the Com-
mission to bring action in federal district court to seek enforcement."
Id. at 242, citing 118 CoNG. REc. 7563 (remarks of Senator Perkins) (1972).
201. Id. at 243-44.
202. 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974).
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The Commission investigated the charges and conducted settlement
discussions with both parties, but it did not make a determination
of reasonable cause or attempt conciliation as the Act and EEOC
regulations require.203 Instead, the Commission proceeded to file
suit, afterward informing the respondents that it had made a deter-
mination of reasonable cause. The court granted summary judg-
ment against the EEOC, holding that either the failure to meet
the statutory requirements that it make a reasonable cause deter-
mination and attempt conciliation or the failure to follow its own
regulations would have provided sufficient reason to dismiss the
charge.
As with investigation procedures, the courts have looked with
disfavor on the EEOC's failure to follow its own regulations con-
cerning conciliation efforts. For instance, the regulations require
that "the respondent shall be notified promptly in writing" of his
"last chance" to conciliate before suit is fied by the Commission.204
While some courts have permitted a cursory notification procedure
to suffice where there has been no showing of prejudice to the
respondent,205 a few district courts have consistently granted dis-
missal where the EEOC has failed to notify the respondent of its
final chance to reopen conciliation discussions. 20 6 One example is
EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co.,2 0 7 in which the court
held that "last chance" notice affords respondents an important
procedural protection which may not be capriciously denied by the
EEOC. The decision was not based on any actual or alleged prej-
udice to the defendant, but upon the court's own determination
that such a denial by the EEOC must of necessity result in prej-
udice. This ruling is inconsistent with the "harmless error" rule
followed in the Sixth Circuit,208 which would allow the deviation
as long as the defendant demonstrated no actual prejudice to its
interests.
One court has allowed the EEOC to by-pass the conciliation
regulations by means of the Commission's "pre-suit letter" proce-
203. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19a, 1601.19b, 1601.22, 1601.25 (1974).
204. Id. § 1601.23.
205. EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 505 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 39 (1975).
206. EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787 (D. Md. 1974);
EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974).
207. 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974). See text accompanying notes
199-201 supra.




dure. In Dickson v. Mortgage & Trust Inc., 20 9 the Commission
investigated the complainant's charge of race discrimination, found
reasonable cause, and then attempted a conciliation. When concilia-
tory efforts failed, the EEOC decided to file suit, but before doing
so, it sent a copy of the proposed complaint with a pre-suit letter
to the respondent, notifying him that he had ten days to discuss
the charges further before suit would be fied. Although it had not
been discussed during the conciliation period, the proposed com-
plaint included a charge of sex discrimination based upon evidence
the EEOC allegedly found during its investigation.
The court permitted this procedure. It held that the notice
given the defendant had been sufficient to comport with due proc-
ess requirements, and more importantly, that "it would be a great
waste of judicial and administrative time to require the EEOC,
when it has alleged that it has become aware of discrimination
beyond the, narrow specifics of the charging party's charge, to start
at the very beginning of the statutory procedures" 210
The Dickson court's notice argument is directly contrary to that
of the Alabama district court in United States Pipe & Foundry 211
which specifically held that the purpose of the reasonable cause
and conciliation requirements was to encourage out-of-court settle-
ments rather than to put the defendant on notice. The second
argument, that the procedure is more efficient, is also somewhat
misleading, since the EEOC would not have to start over from the
beginning if it chose to expand upon the original complaint. It
could have complied with the statutory procedure simply by issuing
a finding of reasonable cause and proceeding with conciliation
efforts before filing suit.
While it is true that the pre-suit letter procedure does allow
the defendant to make some response to the charges, it is directly
contrary to published EEOC regulations 212 and to the procedure
outlined in the Act. As with other deviations from mandated pro-
cedure, the acceptability of the pre-suit letter procedure should turn
on the ability of the EEOC to prove that it is necessary rather than
209. 9 CCH EwL. PaAc. DEC. 1f 10,215 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
210. Id. at 7955.
211. EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D.
Ala. 1974).
212. The procedure was "explained in an EEOC Memorandum dated
June 29, 1973, from the General Counsel," but it is not contained in the
Federal Register. Dickson v. Mortgage & Trust Inc., 9 CCH EMwL. PRAC.
DEc. 1 10,215 at 7955 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
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on the defendant's ability to prove prejudice.213 It is reasonable
to expect the Commission to explain its disregard for its own regu-
lations, but it might be difficult for a defendant to prove that he
was prejudiced by subtle factors such as insufficient time to prepare
a defense.
There is some question whether the EEOC's failure to follow
its own regulations could be invalidated on due process grounds,
since the regulations do not purport to create any constitutional
rights.214 However, there is judicial precedent indicating that "the
persons whose interests a regulation is meant to promote have a
'right' or are 'entitled' to have the regulation enforced" 215  The
"right" becomes even stronger where, as in conciliation cases, it is
granted by an Act of Congress as 'well as by Commission regula-
tions.
V. CONCLUSION
The Civil Rights Act is still a relatively young statute, and many
of the procedural difficulties that have arisen in its application may
be attributed to growing pains. The United States Civil Bights
Commission has suggested that only another amendment will really
solve the problems.216 However, some basic considerations emerge
from the case law which could lead to quicker and easier solutions.
First, if, as has been suggested, Title VII is indeed a "remedial"
statute to be "equitably" construed, the equities must be balanced
on both sides. Protections are built into the statute for defendants
as well as for plaintiffs, including time limitations, notice require-
ments, and conciliation procedures. The courts have the expertise
to apply the balancing process which is necessary to a fair adjudica-
tion. It is up to them to see that both parties are protected. The
current inconsistencies in judicial approach are counterproductive
for the litigants and for society. Because neither party can accu-
rately predict the outcome of a procedural battle, time is lost and
resources are wasted.
Secondly, the EEOC could solve a number of difficulties by
conforming its regulations to the language of the Act and by
213. Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HASv.
L. 11Ev. 629, 650-51 (1974).
214. Id. at 654-55.
215. Id. at 632.
216. CIvm RIGHTS REP RT 649 et seq.
[VoL. 27:371
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stricter adherence to its own official procedures. Its interpretations
are to be accorded the "great deference" normally accorded an
agency charged with interpreting a statute,21 7 but too often it has
been the cause, rather than the cure, of misapplications of the law.
The plaintiff has the right to rely on the EEOC's procedural direc-
tions and the defendant has the right to expect fair notice and
hearing. Until these rights can be guaranteed, the Commission has
failed to implement the policies underlying the Civil Rights Act.
FRANCEs F. Gongs
217. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006, 1007 (1971).
